der Hand, daß ein so verstandenes τὰ νῦν sich nicht nur dem unmittelbaren Kontext sinnvoll einfügt, sondern sich auch sowohl mit der Zeitbestimmung μετὰ ταῦτα wie dem Vorbehalt ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ (739e) aufs beste verträgt.

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aber die Junktur θεοὶ καὶ θεῶν παῖδες, die eine besondere Pointe beinhalten muß. Eine solche ergibt sich, wenn man den Ausdruck in Bezug setzt zu 739d (θεοὶ ἢ παῖδες θεῶν als Bewohner des Idealstaates; vgl. 853c); die Formel könnte dann mit leichter Ironie besagen: ‚soweit unsere idealen Bürger überhaupt derartige Gesetze gegen Raub und Diebstahl erforderlich machen' (ein anderer, nicht recht überzeugender Lösungsversuch bei E. Sandvoss, Soteria. Philosophische Grundlagen der platonischen Gesetzgebung, Göttingen 1971, 295).

PERSUASION THROUGH CHARACTER AND THE COMPOSITION OF ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC

It is well known that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was originally two works. Our Books 1 and 2 formed an *Art of Rhetoric*, while Book 3 was a separate treatise *On Style* (Diogenes Laertius 5.24)[1]). Who combined these two works is nowhere stated explicitly, but it seems reasonable to think of Andronicus, who edited the *Corpus Aristotelicum* in the latter half of the first century B.C. He is said to have organized the *Corpus* by subject matter (Porphyry, Vit. Plot. 24), and we can easily imagine him joining texts that were written independently of each other – texts that belong to different periods in Aristotle's development and occasionally contain views that are at odds with each other.

1) See P. Moraux, Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote (Louvain 1951) 97, 103–4, G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton 1963) 103 and I. Düring, Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens (Heidelberg 1966) 118. For the purposes of this paper we need not consider the possibility of further divisions: e. g., picking out Rhet. 2.23–4 and identifying it with the lost work entitled *Divisions of Enthymemes* (Diogenes Laertius 5.24).

This is, of course, an old idea, but it remains important for understanding the *Corpus Aristotelicum* as a whole and the *Rhetoric* in particular. The introduction to *Rhetoric* 1–2 is a case in point. It is composed of two chapters, 1.1 and 1.2, of which the first appears to be the earlier. Rhetoric as an art is restricted to argumentation, and other modes of persuasion like emotional appeal are labeled accessory (1354a13–14, b19–22). In contrast, the second chapter adopts a more inclusive notion of rhetorical art. Emotional appeal is now recognized as a technical mode of persuasion and placed alongside argumentation and the presentation of good character. A similar dichotomy is also found in the introduction to *Rhetoric* 3. This introduction does not extend to two chapters – it is confined to 3.1 – but it does have two distinct parts of which the first (1403b6–18) is likely to be the later. It includes emotional appeal and persuasion through character and so contrasts with the second (1403b18–1404a39) which adopts a positive attitude toward argument based upon facts. Other modes of persuasion are called superfluous and said to be effective only because of defects in one's audience.

This interpretation of *Rhetoric* 1.1–2 and 3.1 has already been argued for in the scholarly literature[2]). My concern here is with an omission – a supporting argument that is not only new but also of some independent interest. Its focus is persuasion through character (πίστις διὰ τοῦ ἤθους). Aristotle introduces this mode of persuasion in 1.2 (1356a2–13), discusses it briefly in 2.1 (1377b23–1378a19) and mentions it again in 3.1 (1403b11–12). What I find striking is that neither 1.1 nor the second part of 3.1 (beginning 1403b18) refers to persuasion through character. This may be chance, but I do not think so. Aristotle is reacting to contemporary rhetoricians who advised orators not only to present their own character in a favorable light but also to denigrate their opponents, and in both cases their recommendations were directed toward working an emotional effect on the auditor. We may compare the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*[3]),

2) Düring (above, note 1) 121 correctly characterizes 3.1 as a *Flickwerk*. On 1.1 and 1.2 in relation to the two parts of 3.1 see W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle's Platonic Attitude Toward Delivery, Philosophy and Rhetoric 19 (1986) 242–54. There is, of course, an opposing view, especially in regard to 1.1–2. See, e.g., W. Grimaldi, Aristotle, Rhetoric I (New York 1980) 8–10, 19–20, 38–39 and J. Sprute, Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik (Göttingen 1982) 36–41, 61–7.

3) The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is often attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus. But whether or not this attribution is correct, its handbook-like character is not in doubt. See, e.g., Kennedy (above, note 1) 114–15.

where these matters are discussed as part of the *prooemium*. The speaker is advised to present good character as a way of winning goodwill for himself (30 1436a37, b16–17) and to vilify his opponents in order to excite anger against them (37 1442a11–14). Not surprisingly Aristotle's own discussion of the *prooemium* in *Rhetoric* 3.14 contains similar material; an orator may use the introductory portion of a speech to remove or create prejudice, secure goodwill or arouse anger (1415a27–36). But Aristotle is equally clear that such uses of the *prooemium* are extraneous. They are directed toward worthless auditors who pay attention to what lies outside the issue under discussion (1415b5–6). This is the language of 1.1 and the second part of 3.1 (cf. 1345a15–18, b16–20; 1404a5–8), and together these sections of the *Rhetoric* advance a narrow view of the rhetorical art: argument alone counts as artful persuasion (1.1 1345a13–15, cf. 3.13 1414a30–6); everything else is superfluous (3.1 1404a7) and at best remedial (3.14 1415a25).

But if this is true, how can Aristotle express himself as he does in 1.2 and 2.1? Why do these chapters recognize persuasion through character as artful? The answer is, I believe, that these chapters belong to a later stage in Aristotle's thinking about the art of rhetoric. He has separated persuasion through character from emotional appeal and developed a notion of persuasion through character that eliminates the unattractive features with which it had been associated. There is no longer any mention of denigrating one's opponent or of attempting to win favor with the audience. Instead, Aristotle focuses on credibility. Persuasion through character aims at making the speaker worthy of belief (ἀξιόπιστος 1.2 1356a5–6), and it accomplishes this goal through manifestations of wisdom, virtue and goodwill (φρόνησις, ἀρετή and εὔνοια 2.1 1378a8–9).

The importance of these three qualities had not been overlooked by contemporary rhetoricians. For example, the author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* considers what an orator should say about himself when the audience is already favorable disposed toward him. The recommendation offered is that the orator mention his goodwill for the city, point out that his advice has been beneficial and say that he is a just man, ready to sacrifice his own interests (30 1436b21–6). In other words, the orator should lay claim to the three attributes named by Aristotle: namely, goodwill toward the citizens, wisdom in offering advice and virtuous character. There is, however, a significant difference in goal. In the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* these three attributes are thought of as a

way to arouse or maintain favorable feelings on the part of the audience (30 1436a37, b16–17). In Aristotle's *Rhetoric* they are the means by which an orator establishes his credibility. This is not to suggest that Aristotle ever wanted to deny the effect that these attributes have on an audience. On the contrary, he was from beginning to end fully aware that manifestations of virtue and well-wishing on the part of an orator often arouse positive, friendly feelings in his audience (Rhet. 2.4 1381a14, 27). What is new is the recognition that wisdom, virtue and goodwill are important apart from emotional effect, and that the soberminded (unemotional) auditor actually looks for these qualities in a speaker. For as Aristotle tells us, men who lack wisdom hold false opinions, and if they lack virtue or goodwill, then they do not say what they actually believe (2.1 1378a9–14). Moreover, there are many situations in which certainty is not attainable. Jurors considering the past and assemblymen deliberating about the future may be confronted with opposing arguments each of which enjoys a measure of persuasive force. In such situations it is reasonable to consider the character of the speakers and to believe the person that excells in wisdom, virtue and goodwill. Aristotle recognizes this and argues that we believe good men more often and more quickly, and we do this whatever the issue be and especially in cases where there is no exact certainty but rather difference of opinion (1.2 1356a6–8). It seems, then, that Aristotle has come to look upon wisdom, virtue and goodwill in a new light. He sees them as qualities that an intelligent audience looks for in a speaker, and he develops a corresponding notion of persuasion through character. The presentation of character is now conceived of as a way in which speakers meet the demands of thoughtful auditors.

In conclusion, let me return to the beginning of this paper and to the work of Andronicus. As I see it, he is responsible for the composition of our *Rhetoric* in three books and in particular for the dichotomous nature of the introductions to Books 1–2 and Book 3. Each of these introductions contains an earlier and a later portion. The earlier portions, 1.1 and the second part of 3.1, emphasize arguing the issue and refer the practices of contemporary rhetoricians to defects in the audience. The later portions, 1.2 and the first part of 3.1, exhibit a wider conception of the rhetorical art – one that makes room for emotional appeal and persuasion through character. The shift here is striking and dependent upon two closely related developments. First (and this is old hat), Aristotle's work on emotion had led to a new understanding of the

way in which emotions are grounded on belief and therefore open to reasoned argument. Once considered hostile to reasonable debate, emotional appeal was now seen to be compatible with arguing an issue before intelligent auditors. Accordingly, Aristotle collected all forms of emotional appeal under the label "persuasion through the hearers" and made this mode of persuasion an integral part of the rhetorical art[4]). Second (and this has been the focus of the present paper), Aristotle recognized that presentations of good character need not aim at working an emotional effect. They may be intended to establish the credibility of the speaker and so to meet the demands of soberminded auditors. Aristotle, therefore, created a third mode of persuasion which he labeled "persuasion through character" and placed alongside argumentation and emotional appeal. These developments led Aristotle to write a new introduction to Books 1–2 (i. e., our 1.2), and when Andronicus joined Book 3 to Books 1–2 he felt obliged to write the short introduction with which Book 3 begins and which takes notice of the three modes of persuasion discussed by Aristotle in Books 1–2. Another editor might have done things differently. He might have suppressed the older introductions, leaving only the second, newer introduction to Books 1–2. That would have tidied things up a bit, but we would have lost some precious indications of an early stage in Aristotle's thought. Perhaps, then, we should thank Andronicus for cutting and pasting in such an untidy, awkward manner. He has, after all, preserved texts from different periods, and in so doing he has given us the materials necessary for appreciating developments in Aristotle's thinking about the art of rhetoric[5]).

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4) W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions, AGPh 52 (1970) 40–70.

5) Versions of this paper were read at the Institute for Classical Studies, London on 21 March 1988 and at a Symposium on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, honoring Father William Grimaldi, held at Fordham University on 23 April 1988. I am grateful for questions raised and suggestions made on both those occasions.